TEORIE VĚDY / THEORY OF SCIENCE / XL / 2018 / 2 LACEY'S CONCEPT OF VALUEFREE SCIENCE Abstract: Many philosophers of science have maintained that science should be value-free; still others believe that such ideal is neither achievable nor desirable for science. Hugh Lacey is presently one of the main supporters of the idea of value-free science and his theory is probably the most debated today and attracts the most attention and criticism. Th erefore, in this text, I will primarily analyze his theory of value-free science. Aft er briefl y defi ning the notion of value I highlight which strategy Lacey chooses to lay a fi rm foundation for the concept of science without value, with his starting point being the diff erentiation between cognitive and non-cognitive values. Th en I describe three basic characteristics of Lacey's value-free science: impartiality, neutrality, and autonomy. However, the overall plan and design of his project, together with some concrete steps he takes, are not without problems in our view. I will try to point out some of these problematic issues and provide brief suggestions for alleviating them. Keywords: value-free science; impartiality; neutrality; autonomy Laceyovo pojetí vědy bez hodnot Abstrakt: Mnoho fi losofů vědy hájí názor, že věda by neměla být zatížena hodnotami; jiní jsou nicméně přesvědčeni, že takový ideál je nejen nedosažitelný, ale není ani žádoucí. Hugh Lacey je v současnosti jedním z hlavních zastánců ideje vědy bez hodnot a jeho teorie je dnes pravděpodobně nejdiskutovanější a přitahuje nejvíce zájmu i kritiky. V předkládaném textu se proto primárně věnujeme jeho koncepci vědy nezatížené hodnotami. Poté, co v krátkosti charakterizujeme pojem hodnoty, vykreslujeme strategii, kterou Lacey volí, aby položil pevné základy své koncepce. Výchozím bodem je rozlišení mezi kognitivními a nekognitivními hodnotami, následuje popis tří základních charakteristik vědy bez hodnot: nestrannosti, neutrality a autonomie. Nicméně celkový rozvrh a výstavba tohoto projektu nejsou z našeho pohledu bez nedostatků, proto v závěru textu na některé z těchto problematických aspektů poukazujeme a pokoušíme se podat stručné návrhy na jejich odstranění. Klíčová slova: věda bez hodnot; nestrannost; neutralita; autonomie MIROSLAV VACURA Department of Philosophy, University of Economics nám. W. Churchilla 1938/4, 130 67 Prague 3, Czech Republic email / vacuram@vse.cz ////// studie / article //////////////////////////////////////////// 212 Th e problem of science, where it is not infl uenced by value judgments, may be familiar to us nowadays, as its history dates back well into the past. Numerous authors have tried to track its historical roots. Proctor refers primarily to the contributions of Francis Bacon, 19th century German universities, Max Weber and positivists.1 Meanwhile, Lacey identifi es several major sources for this idea: metaphysical (associated with Galileo), epistemological (associated with Bacon), metaethical (related to the notion of value judgments being subjective and therefore non-rational), and logical (based on the Humean distinction between facts and values.2 Douglas, however, argues that the development of a concept of value-free science in its current form can only be traced back to the 1960s.3 Lacey is presently one of the main supporters of the idea of value-free science, who, in his work, seeks to build on the above-mentioned classical authors, on the one hand, and to refl ect the criticism of these classical concepts from postmodern positions, on the other. Douglas, another author interested in value-free science, writes: "Th e most careful examiner and defender of the value-free ideal for science since the 1990s is probably Hugh Lacey."4 Of course, there are other authors who discuss the problem of value-free science: while we can mention the texts of Shrader-Frechette5 or Longino,6 Lacey's concept is probably the most debated today and attracts the most attention and criticism. Th erefore, in this text, we will primarily analyze his theory of value-free science as follows. First, we briefl y defi ne the notion of value. Th en we highlight which strategy Lacey chooses to lay a fi rm foundation for the concept of science without value, with his starting point being the diff erentiation 1 Robert N. Proctor, Value-Free Science? Purity and Power in Modern Knowledge (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991). 2 Hugh Lacey, Is Science Value Free? Values and Scientifi c Understanding (London: Routledge, 2005), 2–7. 3 Heather E. Douglas, Science, Policy and the Value-Free Ideal (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2009), 44. 4 Ibid., 16. 5Kristin Shrader-Frechette, Risk and Rationality (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991); Kristin Shrader-Frechette, Burying Uncertainty: Risk and the Case against Geological Disposal of Nuclear Waste (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993); Kristin ShraderFrechette, Ethics of Scientifi c Research (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefi eld, 1994). 6 Helen E. Longino, Science as Social Knowledge (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990). Research was supported by Research Support Center UEP project number VSE IGS F5/31/2018. Miroslav Vacura 213 between cognitive and non-cognitive values. Any talk of value-free science eff ectively means science without any non-cognitive values. Such science has three basic characteristics, which Lacey describes thus: impartiality, neutrality and autonomy. We describe these characteristics in three separate sections. In formulating a concept of value-free science, Lacey also tries to refl ect some aspects of the postmodern criticism of science. While he rejects the most radical form of such criticism, he attempts to integrate some postmodern approaches with the traditional concept of scientifi c research. Th e overall plan and design of his project, together with some concrete steps he takes, are not without problems in our view. In the last section we will try to point out some of these problematic issues and provide brief suggestions for alleviating them. However, we generally regard Lacey's project for value-free science, even in its current form, as an important contribution to the philosophy of science, while some of the controversies that it had sparked have been benefi cial to the ongoing discussions within this discipline. Th e Concept of Value Th e starting point for the exploration of the ideal of value-free science should be to defi ne the concept of value in this context. Th is concept is usually not applied in a clear, well-defi ned way. In diff erent contexts, you can encounter diff erent ways of using this term. Lacey submits the following list of meanings of the term "personal value" as used in common discourse: 1. A fundamental good that one pursues consistently over an extended period of one's life; an ultimate reason for one's actions. 2. A quality (or a practice) that a. gives worth, goodness, meaning or a fulfi lling character to the life one is leading or aspiring to lead. b. is partially constitutive of one's identity as a self-evaluating, selfinterpreting and a partly self-making being. 3. A fundamental criterion for one to choose what is good among possible courses of action. 4. A fundamental standard to which one holds the behavior of self and others.7 7 Lacey, Is Science Value Free?, 23 (added emphasis). Lacey's Concept of Value-Free Science 214 Lacey's observation emphasizes the fundamental nature of values, which is probably adequate for values that are personal. Such a defi nition, however, cannot be understood as a general defi nition of the value per se, which, in any case, Lacey does not provide. Against personal and social values (which he considers belong under the same heading), he places cognitive values (we will discuss them later). In addition to this defi nition of the concept of personal value, Lacey lists in parallel the concept of "objects of value," i.e., objects to which one can relate and which are constitutive of a worthwhile life and personal identity. Examples of such objects include works of art, scientifi c theories and devices. Connected with the concept of objects of value is that of an "appropriate relationship" with it. Examples of such relationships are, according to Lacey, production, reproduction, respect, nurturance, and maintenance.8 Personal relationships are related to human behavior, in the context of which it is only possible to interpret them. Th e empirical concept of human behavior is founded in desires and beliefs – people act because they believe that the action will lead to satisfaction of a specifi c desire. Th ese individual desires are usually manifested in behavior in certain mutual relationships with other people. Th e person himself evaluates his behavior and, at the same time, other people judge him. Th e set of desires, their interrelationships, and their evaluations bear, at their core, the values of the acting agent. Only through these values is it possible to off er a full explanation of each action. Th e behavior of an individual is not a random sequence of diverse actions, but their meaning can only be explained by their relationship to values of the acting person. Values are sometimes characterized as secondorder desires.9 Th e discourse on values has a specifi c grammar. Lacey distinguishes several types of statements: 1. Value judgments: "v is value" or "v1 is subordinate to v2."10 2. Fundamental expressions: "X values that f be characterized by v."11 3. Measuring expressions: "v is manifested in f to such and such degree."12 8 Ibid. 9 Charles Taylor, Human Agency and Language: Philosophical Papers, Vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985). 10 See Lacey, Is Science Value Free?, 39. 11 Ibid., 45. See also Rudolf Carnap, "Th e Elimination of Metaphysics Th rough Logical Analysis of Language," Erkenntnis 2 (1932): 60–81. 12 See Lacey, Is Science Value Free?, 39. Miroslav Vacura 215 Th e fi rst statement type applies diff erent values to the mutual relationship and allows for the creation of value hierarchies. Th e third type of statement allows us to talk about the extent to which an entity has a certain value. However, it is the second kind that will be of particular signifi cance for our discussion, because, on its grammatical basis, Lacey tries to distinguish cognitive values from non-cognitive values. Possibility of this distinction is the primary thesis of Lacey's approach: cognitive values are values attributed to human belief and (scientifi c) theories, while non-cognitive values are everything else (social, personal etc.). Cognitive values then play important role in what he calls "rational acceptability" of a theory.13 Rational acceptability of the theory is manifested by its high cognitive value (singular), which is defi ned by the high degree of the manifestation of cognitive values (plural) in the theory. Cognitive Values Lacey's fundamental assumption is that there are specifi c kinds of values: namely, cognitive values. If we start from the basic value expression, "X values that f be characterized by v," then X designates a person, v designates a cognitive value and f designates a person's belief or scientifi c theory. Belief is a propositional attitude whose fundamental expression is "X believes that p" (X is an agent, p is a proposition). We can say that belief is true, when proposition p is true.14 We can furthermore distinguish beliefs that one simply has (it informs one's action) and those that one holds (one refl ectively endorses that it informs one's action).15 Some beliefs may be regarded as "knowledge" if they satisfy other complex requirements. Cognitive values are, in many cases, shared; indeed, Lacey even says: "It is diffi cult to get away from the sense that there is a correct set of cognitive values that one ought to aspire to identify."16 Th is claim, however, does not presuppose that these values cannot change throughout the course of history. Th ere are historical disagreements about specifi c members on the list of cognitive values with regard to scientifi c theories. Diff erent authors propose diff erent (sets of) cognitive values, such as:17 13 "Judgments of degree of rational acceptability are framed by the ideal truth, but we have no indicator of truth other than rational acceptability." Lacey, Is Science Value Free?, 46. 14 Ibid., 45–46. 15 Ibid., 47. 16 Ibid., 52 (added emphasis). 17 Ibid., 53. Lacey's Concept of Value-Free Science 216 certainty;18 inductive derivability;19 accuracy, consistency, predictive and explanatory scope, simplicity and fruitfulness;20 + instrumental effi cacy;21 + high degree of falsifi ability;22 + capability to explain problems with historically preceding theories through a narrative;23 – simplicity, explanatory scope.24 Lacey himself presents a list of cognitive values, but without any defi nite endorsement. Th e primary problem of this concept is not the uncertainty surrounding the list of cognitive values, but what this uncertainty shows – the ambiguity of how to defi ne cognitive value in general. Th e discussion of the correct list of cognitive values thus reveals that the above-presented characterization of cognitive values is inadequate, while cognitive values that are acceptable (and desirable) in science must also meet certain other requirements. To resolve this problem, Lacey lists two other requirements defi ning cognitive value:25 1. It be needed to explain (perhaps under idealization or rational reconstruction) theory choices that are actually made, and the character of controversies engaged in by the community of scientists. 2. Th at it is a criterion of cognitive value – an indicator of sound scientifi c understanding – be well defended. Th e fi rst of these principles was introduced by McMullin, but his rationalization is purely historical and traditionalist: "Th e characteristic values guiding theory-choice are fi rmly rooted in the complex learning experience 18 René Descartes, Discourse on Method (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1998). 19 Francis Bacon, "Novum Organum Scientiarum," in Th e Works of Francis Bacon, Pt. 1, eds. James Spedding, Robert Leslie Ellis, and Douglas Denon Heath (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt : Frommann-Holzboog, 1963). Isaac Newton, Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica (London, 1687). 20 Th omas Kuhn, "Objectivity, Value Judgment and Th eory Choice," in Th omas Kuhn, Th e Essential Tension (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977). 21 Hilary Putnam, Reason, Truth and History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981). 22 Karl R. Popper, Th e Logic of Scientifi c Discovery (New York: Harper, 1959). 23 Alisdair MacIntyre, "Epistemological Crises, Dramatic Narrative and Philosophy of Science," Th e Monist 60, no. 4 (1977): 453–72. 24 Bas C. van Fraasen, Th e Scientifi c Image (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980). 25 Lacey, Is Science Value Free?, 91. Miroslav Vacura 217 which is the history of science; this is their primary justifi cation, and it is an adequate one."26 Lacey endorses this attitude, but adds: "Th ere is no good reason to hold, however, that the values guiding theory choice that are rooted in this complex learning experience are necessarily all cognitive values."27 Th is is an ambiguous expression – Lacey means that some of the values, which are traditionally considered to be cognitive, may in fact be non-cognitive values (and vice versa), which in practice may have an infl uence on the process of choosing the accepted theory in science. Th erefore, if some values are not warranted enough (Principle 2), then they should be excluded from the list of cognitive values. As an example, he refers to the values associated with "materialistic strategies" of scientifi c research, i.e., the values associated with quantitative and mathematic scientifi c methods of understanding, which posit science as a means of controlling natural forces. Th e second of Lacey's principle refers to the question about whether the given value "serves the objectives of science."28 For this to be possible, it is necessary to fi rst determine the purpose of science. Lacey provides the following defi nition: "Th e objective of science is to gain understanding of phenomena. Th is includes to encapsulate (reliably in rationally acceptable theories) possibilities that are open to a domain of objects, and to discover means to realize some of the hitherto unrealized possibilities."29 His defi nition intentionally tries to evade Baconian references to the practical usability of science for controlling nature. Th e use of dictionary of "open possibilities" and "means to realize" seeks to provide a more general account of the objective of science, as opposed to the account associated with "materialistic strategy," which Lacey tries to avoid. Defi ning the objective of science and cognitive values thus enables him to proceed with defi ning his concept of value-free science. 26 Ernan McMullin, "Values in Science," in PSA 1982, vol. 2, eds. P. D. Asquith and T. Nickles (East Lansing: Philosophy of Science Association, 1983), 19. See also Ernan McMullin, "Rationality and Paradigm Change in Science," in World Changes: Th omas Kuhn and the Nature of Science, ed. Paul Horwich (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1993). Lacey also quotes Kuhn, who wrote in a similar spirit: "those values are in part learned from that experience and they evolve with it" (Kuhn, Objectivity, Value Judgment and Th eory Choice, 335). 27 Lacey, Is Science Value Free?, 91. 28 Ibid., 93. 29 Ibid., 102. Lacey's Concept of Value-Free Science 218 Science Free of Values How can we generally explain the claim of value-free science when we have shown that infl uencing scientifi c research with certain values, is in some cases, unproblematic? Th e essential feature of science is that it is headed, in Lacey's terms, towards "understanding of phenomena." Th e social value of theory is thus closely related to its rational acceptability as manifested by the cognitive value of a theory. Within the diff erent theoretical approaches to scientifi c research, there may be diff erent views on whether the goal of true knowledge is attainable, or that it is only an ideal, such as the Kantian regulatory idea. Th ere is relatively general agreement that science, as a process and a set of methods, aims to achieve a specifi c kind of knowledge; and, as a system, it is a system of methods appropriate to this goal, which have been developed throughout the course of history. Th is central role of methods, the ideal of knowledge or truth, or, in Lacey's case, the concept of rational acceptability, also determines the role of other values in science. If we talk about value-free science, we mean science in which the infl uence of moral, personal, social or aesthetic values is limited. On the contrary, any science, as far as the contemporary concept of science is concerned, must refl ect cognitive values as much as possible. Th e input of non-cognitive values into the context of scientifi c research is permissible if they support, or at least do not hinder, the attainment of knowledge. On the contrary, if the infl uence of non-cognitive values in the context of scientifi c research negatively aff ects research, with respect to cognitive values, i.e., it aff ects the direction towards knowledge, and these noncognitive values take precedence over cognitive ones, then such interference is considered unacceptable. In an informal context, the distinction is nowadays captured by terms "good science" and "bad science" (or "junk science").30 Th e term "bad science" is used to refer to scientifi c outcomes suff ering from some of a whole range of diff erent issues. Such problems may be of a specifi cally methodological nature, e.g., a setup of an experiment that has not accounted for confounding variables, the use of an inappropriate sample size or time frame, or the use of selective data.31 Th ese methodological problems obviously limit the possibility of achieving reliable results in research. However, some kinds 30 Th e term "pseudoscience" refers to activities that do not respect scientifi c methodology. 31 E. C. M. Parsons and Andrew J. Wright, "Th e Good, the Bad and the Ugly Science: Examples from the Marine Science Arena," Frontiers in Marine Science 33, no. 2 (2015): 2. Miroslav Vacura 219 of bad science may suff er from diff erent than methodological issues, like plagiarism.32 Methodologically wrong research can be caused by the infl uence of non-cognitive values in its course, for example, if a researcher has a personal fi nancial interest in research leading to a positive conclusion, he might use selective data before the statistical processing stage, such that the values that do not match the desired result are removed. In cases of confl ict of interests the notion of junk science is oft en used. To formally limit these issues, Lacey formulates three basic principles that characterize value-free science: impartiality, neutrality and autonomy. Impartiality Impartiality is the primary characteristic of value-free science, and Lacey repeatedly acknowledges that the remaining two principles – neutrality and autonomy – are dependent on and derived from it. Th erefore, we will fi rstly focus our discussion on this principle. Th e concept of impartiality primarily concerns the sound acceptance of scientifi c theories. Th e basic principle of impartiality is the aforementioned distinction of cognitive and noncognitive values, with the other two principles based on this distinction. Th e result of this arrangement is the following set of three basic principles of impartiality of science: 1. Th e cognitive values are distinct and distinguishable from other values, and they may be manifested in theories developed under a variety of diff erent strategies. 2. [Scientifi c theory] T is accepted of [domain] D under [strategy] S if, and only if, T is accepted of D under a strategy S; and so, in relation to [empirical data] E, manifests the cognitive values highly according to the most rigorous available standards; and to a higher degree than any rival theory manifests them in relation to the data appropriate in the light of the strategy under which it developed – where T meets the constraints of and the items of E have been selected in accordance with S, and some of the rivals are (were) developed and appraised under diff erent strategies. 32 Th ere is lot of kinds of bad science, see Daniele Fanelli, "Th e Black, the White and the Grey Areas: Towards an International and Interdisciplinary Defi nition of Scientifi c Misconduct," in Promoting Research Integrity in a Global Environment, eds. Tony Mayer and Nicholas Steneck (Singapore: World Scientifi c Pub Co Inc, 2011), 79–90. Lacey's Concept of Value-Free Science 220 3. T is rejected of D if, and only if a rival theory (T') is accepted of D, and T and T' are inconsistent, regardless of the strategies under which T' developed.33 From these three basic principles, there is an implication that defi nes science, when operated in accordance with them, as value free. Non-cognitive values and also any opinion as to whether theory is, for some reason, signifi cant cannot be used as reasons to accept the theory in the context of science that we defi ne as value free: 4. Values and assessments of a theory's signifi cance are not among the grounds for accepting and rejecting theories. 34 In the whole defi nition, there are a few problematic issues. Th e fi rst is the question of "strategies" – Lacey is convinced that contemporary science is based on "materialistic strategies," whose primary characteristic is that they are based on the ideal and the value of the ability to control natural forces: Certain values connected with the control of nature rank especially highly in modern value complexes. I will argue [...], that the nearly unanimous adoption of materialist strategies in modern scientifi c practices becomes intelligible largely in virtue of its mutually reinforcing interaction with these values.35 Materialistic strategies are then characterized from a methodological point of view as follows: they compromise the "generally quantitative and mathematical [...] kinds of terms that apply to phenomena considered as generated from underlying structure, processes and laws rather than considered as an integral part of daily life and social practice."36 Materialist strategies are also considered successful because they facilitate what they promise: to exercise control over (material) things. Lacey is convinced that there are other strategies that can make scientifi c research meaningful, while formulating the principles of value-free science in such a way that even these non-materialistic strategies are acceptable within the context of science that can be called value free. Th e disadvantage of materialistic strategies, according to him, is that they abstain from social 33 Lacey, Is Science Value Free?, 230. 34 Ibid. 35 Ibid., 111. 36 Ibid., 68. Miroslav Vacura 221 and ecological values.37 Widening the defi nition of impartiality, so that it does not solely presuppose materialistic strategies, opens up space for other "fruitful" (non-materialistic) strategies. As examples of non-materialistic strategies, Lacey proposes "grassroots" approaches and feminist theories.38 In the fi rst case, he contemplates the concept of "development" in the context of Th ird World countries and introduces the revised concept of "authentic development" (we will discuss this in the conclusion in more detail). Feminist strategy is understood by Lacey as generally compliant with the principle of impartiality (see the next section), because he interprets it as an approach that is, in essence, based on bias elimination. Th e limitation of the autonomy of science (defi ned later in this text) by the feminist approach is settled by the claim that "autonomy does not hold even of research conducted under the materialist strategies."39 Th is is of course in contradiction with the idea that autonomy is an ideal (similarly to other principles), which, although not met in reality in every scientifi c inquiry, it is nevertheless necessary to strive for its fulfi llment in science when understood properly as value free. In the case of feminist strategies, it seems that Lacey is complacent about being completely resigned to this ideal. As a result, it seems that the ideal of autonomy is considered insignifi cant, or that he abandons it entirely or partially when it stands in the way of feminist scientifi c strategy. Lacey is thus trying to build a theory of value-free science that refl ects and is integrates with the feminist critique of science.40 Nevertheless, his approach to value-free science has become the target of feminist criticism, which is the subject of further extensive discussion in the literature.41 Th e key point in the concept of impartiality is Principle 2 – Lacey admits, however, that, in current scientifi c practice, as it is functioning in reality, there are numerous exceptions: the cases where scientifi c theories are accepted by the scientifi c community for reasons other than their high manifestation of cognitive values. Th at said, this does not mean that these principles are not understood in contemporary science as an ideal, while accepting a theory that does not match them does not count as failure. 37 Ibid., 139. 38 Ibid., 224. 39 Ibid., 201. 40 Longino, Science as Social Knowledge. 41 For example, Stéphanie Ruphy, "'Empiricism All the Way Down': A Defense of the ValueNeutrality of Science in Response to Helen Longino's Contextual Empiricism," Perspectives on Science 14, no. 2 (2006): 189–214. Lacey's Concept of Value-Free Science 222 Neutrality and Autonomy Th e concept of the value neutrality of science includes three basic principles:42 1) no value consequences; 2) consistent with all value judgments; 3) evenhandedness in application. Th ese three principles of neutrality in their formally developed form are expressed by Lacey as follows: 1. Practices of scientifi c (systematic empirical) inquiry variety of strategies generate theories, that are accepted in I, such that: 2. accepting these theories implies no value commitments; 3. accepting them neither undermines nor supports holding any one of the ranges of viable value complexes; and 4. in principle, for any value complex that remains viable as the stock of theories (accepted in accordance with I) expands in the course of research that puts its presuppositions to empirical test: a. there are some accepted theories, developed under materialist strategies, that are signifi cant to some extent; and b. there are some accepted theories, some of which may be developed under non-materialist strategies, that are highly signifi cant.43 Th e fi rst principle states that adopting a theory consistent with the principle of impartiality does not imply the necessity of accepting some (non-cognitive) values. Generally, it is valid with regard to direct logical implication, as a result of the Humean diff erentiation between normative and factual assertions. Factual statements cannot have normative implications. Given a theory (e.g., that things have some property, or are somehow related, or that natural law applies), there cannot be any directly implied normative statement (e.g., saying what someone should do). However, on closer inspection, the fi rst principle of neutrality also seems debatable. Scientifi c theory may have an indirect infl uence on normative statements, based on the validity of other normative statements. For example, assuming the acceptance of "health" as a non-cognitive value regarding the quality of human life and the adoption of a related normative imperative "to seek to preserve health," then accepting the scientifi c theory that smoking cigarettes seriously damages health can imply a normative requirement not to smoke. Th erefore, we need to interpret the fi rst principle of neutrality in the sense that scientifi c theory itself cannot have any direct 42 Lacey, Is Science Value Free?, 75. 43 Ibid., 240. Miroslav Vacura 223 value consequences. However, its acceptance in the context of other values and normative assertions can have normative consequences.44 Th e second principle asserts that a theory, which is accepted with regard to the principle of impartiality (cognitive values of such a theory are manifested to a higher degree than in a competitive theory), is neutral with respect to non-cognitive value judgments. Th at means that such a theory is consistent with diff erent (non-cognitive) value systems. As this is not necessarily true, Lacey introduces the concept of "viable value complexes," defi ned on the basis of impartiality: "A value complex is viable if its presuppositions are consistent with the body of theories which have been accepted (of the relevant domains) in accordance with impartiality."45 Th e second principle, therefore, merely asserts that the theory, adopted on the basis of the principle of impartiality, is consistent with all the value systems whose assumptions respect the principle of impartiality. Th e third principle expresses that theories are neutral with respect to their application, such that science can even serve, at least to some extent, the interest of all (viable) value complexes. However, Lacey acknowledges that, in the context of today's practical science, a much simpler modifi ed version of a third principle of neutrality is accepted, which reads as follows: 3' For any viable value complex, there are (in principle) some accepted theories that are signifi cant to some extent.46 Lacey is concerned that this principle does not suffi ciently refl ect the alternative strategies we have mentioned previously. Th erefore, he prefers a more complex Defi nition 3 as introduced beforehand, which paves the way for alternative strategies, given that theories are explicitly expected to further those as well. We consider this approach to be problematic; however, we postpone a detailed discussion until the following section. Th e principle of autonomy concerns an environment where research, which is performed in accordance with the principles of impartiality and neutrality, can take place. Th is environment consists primarily of the scientifi c community and the processes that connect this community with its surrounding environment. Th e principle of autonomy thus primarily 44 "In some historically striking cases [...], the consequences of accepting a theory have indeed included undermining certain fundamental values." Ibid., 76. 45 Ibid., 78. 46 Ibid., 238. "I do not doubt that most members of the scientifi c community would endorse an articulation like N' [i.e., 3'] rather than N [i.e., 3]" (ibid., 244). Lacey's Concept of Value-Free Science 224 concerns external infl uences on scientifi c research. Ideally, the autonomy of the scientifi c community should relate to the choice of subject matter and the methods of research. Th e scientifi c community should be autonomously constituted, i.e., constituted by itself, deciding on whom its members are and who are not. Th e scientifi c community should manage its own institutions, including educational ones. To the public, the scientifi c community should act as the entity responsible for its above-mentioned functions. Lacey off ers the following provisional defi nition of autonomy: 1. Scientifi c practices aim to gain theories that are accepted in accordance with I[mpartiality] and whose acceptance accords with N[eutrality]. 2. Th ey are conducted without "outside interference" by the scientifi c community which: a) defi nes its own problems, etc.; b) has unique authority with respect to matters of method, etc.; c) determines who is admitted into the scientifi c community, and what counts as competence and excellence; d) shapes scientifi c education and scientifi c institution; e) forms its members in the practice of the "scientifi c ethos"; and f) exercises its responsibility to the public fully by acting in accord with items a)–e). 3. Th e scientifi c community conducts its investigations in self-governed institutions which are free from "outside interference," but provided with suffi cient resources in order to conduct its investigations effi ciently.47 It is obvious, as Lacey recognizes, that such a description of autonomy does not correspond to the current scientifi c reality of the world. Th e economic interconnection of scientifi c communities with their surroundings (government, the public sector and the commercial sector) explains why the subject of research is oft en determined externally (and in turn externally funded). Lacey recognizes that Points (a) and (d) can be weakened, for example, by working together with outside institutions unless this is inconsistent with the principle of 1) the impartiality and neutrality of research.48 Conclusion and Critique Th e theory that Lacey puts forward in his text is undoubtedly an important contribution to the theory of value-free science. We must highlight, in particular, his refl ections on the distinction between cognitive and noncognitive values, as well as his attempt to defi ne the three principles of the 47 Lacey, Is Science Value Free?, 248. 48 Ibid., 84. Miroslav Vacura 225 value-free science: impartiality, neutrality, and autonomy. On the other hand, it is not possible to ignore the fact that his approach appears (if we disregard the minor critical remarks that we have stated previously) to be burdened by some fundamental problems. Th e main diffi culty is the very concept of diff erent scientifi c strategies. Th e defi nition of the objective of science as put forward by Lacey, i.e., to gain understanding of phenomena, does not, according to him, lead immediately and necessarily to materialistic strategies. Materialistic strategies are not just quantitative and mathematical; they are related to what Lacey repeatedly calls "modern values of control." He seems to accept the idea that there are some autonomous, self-serving values concerning the control of nature, which modern science serves. Conversely, he would appear to ignore the fact that controlling nature is usually the only means to eff ectively attain other goals such as health, acceptable living conditions or, in some cases, even goals such as better entertainment. Instead, he explicitly links values relating to the control of nature to the "Western" concept of "modernizing development" (which includes economic growth, technology transfer and industrialization), which is associated with individualism and, in turn, capitalism. Th us, being guided by materialistic strategies, science is guilty of lagging behind in the area of human values in some Th ird World countries.49 Against this backdrop, he puts forward alternative strategies, which, rather than recognizing these autonomous values about the control of nature, are motivated diff erently. In reaction to the concept of "modernizing development," he proposes the concept of "authentic development," which is based on concepts of oppression and suff ering. For Lacey: "Authentic development is meant to be a response to concrete and multidimensional suff erings of large numbers of people."50 Th erefore, the measure of authentic development is concerned with not only "material progress and economic innovation per se," but also the "poor claiming their human agency" and "the unleashing of their capabilities for exercising responsibility in shaping the conditions which structure their lives."51 Authentic development thus evolves primarily out of local grassroots movements in, for example, South America. Lacey also introduces the concept of "appropriate technol49 Ibid., 182–83. 50 Ibid., 184. 51 Ibid. Lacey's Concept of Value-Free Science 226 ogy," which is defi ned as a "technology that serves the interests of authentic development."52 Such an approach represents, in our view, a fundamental mixing of science (and its cognitive values and methods) with questions (and values) about politics and the moral domain, i.e., phenomena that are non-cognitive and non-scientifi c in their nature. It seems that the main and essential difference of this "grassroots" strategy in science is the choice of goals to be pursued by research. For us, referring to the selection of scientifi c research goals as "scientifi c strategy" is unfortunate (it also diff ers from Kuhn's usage of this term). Applying such terminology introduces a confusing lexicon into the discourse of scientifi c methodology. Paradoxically, in work whose main purpose ought to lie in a precise defi nition of values relevant to science, i.e., cognitive values, and consequently in defi ning the core of science as being methodologically limited to the consideration of these values, the introduction of the conceptual apparatus of "research strategy" leads to a conceptual mixing of scientifi c (and cognitive) concepts and political concepts (concepts related to "social justice" etc.). Th e argument that such mixing always occurs in practice as well does not hold, because one of the purposes of philosophical work is to provide not just the sociological description of the real operation of science, but also a conceptual analysis, whose aim is a precise conceptual defi nition and delimitation, which can also be understood as an ideal that is unreachable in real scientifi c practice, yet serving a regulatory function for the same practice.53 If we were to off er an alternative approach, we would also start by distinguishing cognitive and non-cognitive values. However, the analysis of the relationship of non-cognitive values (e.g., political or moral) to scientifi c research must distinguish the basic forms of how these values can generally infl uence scientifi c practice. Such a distinction may, for example, take the form of a 1) infl uencing the goals of scientifi c research, 2) infl uencing the process of science and 3) infl uencing the use of scientifi c results in practice.54 Infl uencing the goals of scientifi c inquiry relates to the selection of issues and problems that scientifi c research has to deal with, i.e., what scientifi c programs should be initiated and how should they be funded. When choos52 Ibid., 187. 53 It is also related to demarcation problem. See Karl R. Popper, Conjectures and Refutations. Th e Growth of Scientifi c Knowledge (New York: Basic Books, 1962), 42. 54 Ruphy identifi es only the fi rst two of these. See Ruphy, "Empiricism All the Way Down." Miroslav Vacura 227 ing the objectives of scientifi c research, political and other non-cognitive values always play some kind of role, because scientifi c research is oft en funded by the state or by other social entities, which inevitably have their own interests. In this context, it may be legitimate to ask whether it would be more appropriate to target scientifi c eff orts in order to produce better luxury products, which would only be used by celebrities in the most advanced countries of the world, or technology to alleviate the suff ering and poverty of Th ird World populations. However, in contrast to Lacey, we believe that different decisions in this area do not constitute diff erent "scientifi c strategies." Th e issue of infl uencing the process of science concerns the infl uence of non-cognitive values on the selection of the "best" scientifi c theories and on the application of the methodological rules of science. Th e universal principle in this context is that only cognitive values should aff ect the choice of scientifi c theories (well expressed in Lacey's principle of impartiality). If we talk about "bad science" or "junk science" (the most appalling examples being "vaccinations cause autism" theory or "intelligent creation" theory), we are also talking about infl uencing the choice of the best theory according to non-cognitive values. Th e value of infl uencing the use of scientifi c results is related to the infl uence of non-cognitive values on how the results of science will be used or applied. Similarly, as in the fi rst point, there is always infl uence, more or less, from political and other non-cognitive values when deciding on the use of scientifi c results, and for the same reasons as already mentioned. Using the results of scientifi c research is a matter of subtle political decision-making and thus infl uenced by non-cognitive values, in turn interfering with the process of science itself. Whether the results of scientifi c research are used to benefi t the richest or the poorest is not a matter of diff erent "scientifi c strategies." It is a political decision that is external to science. Th ese distinctions are not explicitly echoed by Lacey. While he speaks of the distinction between pure science and applied science, he immediately dismisses this distinction by pointing out the assumed practical irrelevance of such a distinction "since scientifi c research is conducted in institutions, pure and applied are never fully separated."55 Th is, of course, may be true in practice, but it does not imply that it might be impossible to separate out the diff erent levels of scientifi c r esearch and apply diff erent methodological requirements to them. As a result, eff orts to integrate political concerns and ideas of social justice with scientifi c methodology and principles of value55 Lacey, Is Science Value Free?, 187. Lacey's Concept of Value-Free Science 228 free science reduce the value of Lacey's work, which is otherwise based on sound foundations. Bibliography: Francis Bacon, "Novum Organum Scientiarum." In Th e Works of Francis Bacon, Pt. 1, eds. James Spedding, Robert Leslie Ellis, and Douglas Denon Heath. StuttgartBad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 1963. Carnap, Rudolf. "Th e Elimination of Metaphysics Th rough Logical Analysis of Language." Erkenntnis 2 (1932): 60–81. Descartes, René. Discourse on Method. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1998. Orig. Publ. 1637. Douglas, Heather E. Science, Policy and the Value-Free Ideal. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2009. Fanelli, Daniele. "Th e Black, the White and the Grey Areas: Towards an International and Interdisciplinary Defi nition of Scientifi c Misconduct." In Promoting Research Integrity in a Global Environment, eds. Tony Mayer and Nicholas Steneck, 79–90. Singapore: World Scientifi c Pub Co Inc, 2011. van Fraasen, Bas C. Th e Scientifi c Image. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980. Kuhn, Th omas. "Objectivity, Value Judgment and Th eory Choice." In Th omas Kuhn, Th e Essential Tension. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977. Lacey, Hugh. Is Science Value Free? Values and Scientifi c Understanding. London: Routledge, 2005. Longino, Helen E. Science as Social Knowledge. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990. MacIntyre, Alisdair. "Epistemological Crises, Dramatic Narrative and Philosophy of Science." Th e Monist 60, no. 4 (1977): 453–72. McMullin, Ernan. "Values in Science." In PSA 1982, eds. P. D. Asquith and T. Nickles. Vol. 2, East Lansing, MI: Philosophy of Science Association, 1983. McMullin, Ernan. "Rationality and Paradigm Change in Science." In World Changes: Th omas Kuhn and the Nature of Science, ed. Paul Horwich. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1993. Newton, Isaac. Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica. London, 1687. Miroslav Vacura 229 Parsons, E. C. M., and Andrew J. Wright. "Th e Good, the Bad and the Ugly Science: Examples from the Marine Science Arena." Frontiers in Marine Science 33, no. 2 (2015): 1–4. Popper, Karl. R. Th e Logic of Scientifi c Discovery. New York: Harper, 1959. Popper, Karl R. Conjectures and Refutations. Th e Growth of Scientifi c Knowledge. New York: Basic Books, 1962. Proctor, Robert N. Value-Free Science? Purity and Power in Modern Knowledge. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991. Putnam, Hilary. Reason, Truth and History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981. Ruphy, Stéphanie. "'Empiricism All the Way Down': A Defense of the Value-Neutrality of Science in Response to Helen Longino's Contextual Empiricism." Perspectives on Science 14, no. 2 (2006): 189–214. Shrader-Frechette, Kristin. Risk and Rationality. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991. Shrader-Frechette, Kristin. Burying Uncertainty: Risk and the Case against Geological Disposal of Nuclear Waste. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993. Shrader-Frechette, Kristin. Ethics of Scientifi c Research. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefi eld, 1994. Taylor, Charles. Human Agency and Language: Philosophical Papers. Vol. 1. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985. Lacey's Concept of Value-Free Science